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Abstract
In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related
to facility location models. The players are the customers (demand points) in the
location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its
members. Specifically, the cost in our games is the service diameter of the coalition.
We study the existence of core allocations for these games, focusing on network
spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge
lengths.
Keywords: Cooperative combinatorial games, core solutions, diameter.
1. Introduction
The goal of cooperative game theory is to study ways to promote and enforce
cooperation among agents (also called players) willing to cooperate. A way to enforce
cooperation is to find suitable allocations of the cost or benefit of such a cooperation
among the players. These allocations must satisfy some rationality principles so
that players are happy about their payoffs. Game theorists have analyzed the above
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problem over the years and have proposed several solutions, core allocations being
the most universally accepted for the fairness properties they satisfy.
Basically, the core of a cooperative situation is the set of allocations of the total
cost that satisfy the individual and collective rationality principles. In cost games,
individual rationality means that no agent is going to be charged more than what he
would pay acting by himself. Collective rationality ensures that no group of agents
(also called coalitions) would be charged more than what they would pay when acting
by themselves. The allocations satisfying those two principles can be considered
stable in the sense that no agent or coalition would have incentives to break the grand
coalition (the coalition consisting of all players), and thus cooperation is sustained.
There is a large body of literature dealing with core concepts in cooperative game
theory, e.g., Owen (1995).
Recall that a generic finite cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N is the set
of players and v is the characteristic function defined from 2N to R, which satisfies
v(∅) = 0, and assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a value (benefit or cost). For conve-
nience, suppose that N = {u1, . . . , uk}. With this notation, and assuming v is a cost
function, the core of (N, v) is the set
C(N, v) = {x ∈ Rk : x(S) ≤ v(S), ∀ S ⊂ N and x(N) = v(N)},
where x(S) =
∑
j:uj∈S
xj , for all S ⊆ N .
In the last decades there has been an increasing interest in studying cost allocation
problems arising from and related to a variety of operations research problems and
general optimization models (see Borm et al. (2001)). Pioneering studies along this
extensive line of research are the papers on assignment games, Shapley and Shubik
(1971), linear production games, Owen (1975), network flow games, Kalai and Zemel
(1982), and minimum spanning tree games, Claus and Kleitman (1973), Bird (1976),
Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984), and Megiddo (1978). Even nowadays, this
subject attracts a lot of interest among researchers, see e.g., the book by Nisan et al.
(2007) and the recent paper by Caprara and Letchford (2010).
Our main interest is in cost allocation games related to location models. Some
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relevant references are Megiddo (1978), Granot (1987), Tamir (1992), Puerto et al.
(2001), Pal and Tardos (2003) and Goemans and Skutella (2004).
The underlying optimization model of the games in this paper considers a con-
nected undirected graph G = (V,E) with positive edge lengths {le}, e ∈ E, where
V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn}, and a set N ⊆ V \ {v0}. Each edge in E is assumed to be
rectifiable. We refer to interior points on an edge by their distances (along the edge)
from the two nodes of the edge. A(G) is the continuum set of points on the edges of
G. For any pair of points x, y ∈ A(G), we let d(x, y) denote the length of a shortest
path connecting x and y. We refer to A(G) as the metric space induced by G and
the edge lengths.
Also given is a finite subset of nodes N ⊆ V \ {v0}. At times we refer to these
nodes as existing facilities, or demand points. The distinguished node, v0, is viewed
as an essential element in the system, e.g., each demand point must have access to
v0. For motivation purposes, assume that the demand points represent patients, and
v0 is the location of a repairman or a medical doctor who provides assistance or
health services, respectively. Suppose first that the cost of serving a coalition S ⊆ N
is proportional to the length of the tour travelled by the server from his home base
v0, visiting each member of the coalition and returning to v0. We then obtain the
travelling salesman game, studied in Tamir (1989) and Kuipers (1991).
In another situation v0 can represent a central depot that all the existing com-
munities must connect to. In this case the cost a coalition has to pay can be the
length of a Steiner subtree connecting its members to v0. This model is discussed in
Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984), Megiddo (1978) and Tamir (1991).
Our study is motivated by location models, where the time elapsed till the service
is provided (response time) is critical. The cost function, also capturing the spreading
of S and its distances from v0, that we study in this paper is the diameter of the
set S ∪ {v0}. As an example of this situation, consider the case in which a set of
cities want to install a system to communicate among themselves. The cost of the
communication system is proportional to the largest distance between a pair of cities,
including the information center v0.
We now formally define the two classes of cooperative cost games based on the
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above facility location problems, that we study in this paper.
For any subgraph G′ = (V ′, E ′) of G = (V,E) we let D∗(G′) denote its diameter,
i.e., the longest of the distances in the space A(G′) between all pairs of nodes in V ′:
D∗(G′) = max
x,y∈V ′
dG′(x, y),
where dG′(x, y) denotes the shortest distance between x and y in A(G
′). (If G′ is not
connected we define D∗(G′) =∞.)
A pair of nodes, vi, vj ∈ G
′ such that the distance between them in G′ is equal to
D∗(G′) is called a diametrical pair of G′.
Suppose that a coalition S ⊆ N , decides to use a subgraph G′ = (V ′, E ′), sat-
isfying S ∪ {v0} ⊆ V
′, to establish communication among its members, including
v0. In many situations the communication cost may depend only on the distances
in A(G′) between pairs of nodes in S ∪ {v0}. However, in some situations, there
is a cost associated with the inclusion of the extra nodes, V ′ \ S ∪ {v0} in the
subgraph. The extra nodes are viewed as auxiliary transmission points.
For example, the technology used might require communication between all pairs
of nodes in the selected subgraph G′. Thus, the cost can depend also on the
distances between pairs of auxiliary transmission points. The two games we
consider in this paper refer to the two scenarios mentioned above, respectively.
The first game, denoted by (N, vI), is the minimum diameter location game
(MDLG), where for each coalition S ⊆ N , the cost is the maximum distance be-
tween pairs of nodes of S ∪ {v0} in the selected subgraph G
′. Since the additional
nodes have no effect on the cost, in order to minimize its cost, the coalition will select
G′ = G = (V,E). Thus, the characteristic function value is defined by the diameter
of S ∪ {v0} in A(G), i.e.,
vI(S) = max
x,y∈S∪{v0}
d(x, y).
Note that the above setup, defined only on a metric space A(G), also captures
the case where N ∪ {v0} are points in a general metric space X . To model such a
general case, consider the complete undirected graph G∗ = (N ′, E ′) with node set
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N ′ = N ∪ {v0}, and for each pair of nodes x, y ∈ N
′ set the length of the edge
connecting them in G∗ to be equal to the distance between them in X .
The second minimum diameter situation introduced in this paper and denoted
by (N, v∗I ), is called the minimum Steiner subgraph diameter game (MSSDG). In this
game the cost of a coalition S ⊆ N , is the maximum distance between all pairs of
nodes in the selected subgraph G′ = (V ′, E ′). The coalition will select the subgraph
minimizing its cost. (Unlike the case of the first game, the best subgraph is not
necessarily the entire graph G.) Formally, the characteristic function v∗I is defined as
follows:
For each subset S ⊆ N , define G(S) to be the set of all connected subgraphs of G
spanning S ∪ v0. G(S) is called the set of Steiner subgraphs spanning S ∪ v0. Given
a coalition S ⊆ N , we define its value, v∗I , as the minimum diameter of a Steiner
subgraph spanning S ∪ {v0}, i.e.,
v∗I (S) = min
G′∈G(S)
D∗(G′).
A subgraph G∗(S) ∈ G(S) such that v∗I (S) = D
∗(G∗) is called S-optimal. By
definition, if G∗(S) = (V ′, E ′) is S-optimal then we can assume without loss of
generality that G∗(S) is induced by its node set V ′, i.e., E ′ consists of all edges
in G connecting pairs of nodes in V ′ only. In particular, if we let E(S ∪ {v0})
denote the set all edges of G connecting pairs of nodes in S ∪ {v0}, then, Gv0(S) =
(S ∪ {v0}, E(S ∪ {v0})), the subgraph induced by S and v0, is a subgraph of G
∗(S).
A game related to (N, v∗I ) is studied in a companion paper, Puerto et al. (2010).
In that game, called the minimum radius location game, or the minimum Steiner
subtree diameter game, the value of a coalition S is the minimum diameter over all
Steiner subtrees spanning S ∪ {v0}.
We emphasize the difference between vI(S) and v
∗
I (S). vI(S) is the longest of the
distances in the space A(G) between all pairs of nodes in S ∪ {v0}, while v
∗
I (S) is
the longest of the distances in the space A(G∗(S)) between all pairs of nodes of an
S-optimal Steiner subgraph G∗(S). In particular,
vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S).
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Also, if the edge lengths of G satisfy the triangle inequality then vI(S) = v
∗
I (S), for
any S ⊆ N .
In the next example we illustrate the difference between the two characteristic
functions.
Example 1.1 Consider the 6 node graph G = (V,E) with V = {v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}
and E = {(v0, v2), (v0, v3), (v0, v4), (v1, v2), (v1, v3), (v1, v4), (v2, v5), (v3, v5)}. Let the
length of the edges (v0, v4), (v1, v4), (v2, v5) and (v3, v5) be equal to 0.5, and let the
length of the remaining 4 edges be equal to 1.
Let S = {v1, v2, v3}. Recall that in order to calculate vI(S), it is sufficient to
consider the entire graph G, and calculate the shortest distances in A(G) between all
pairs of nodes in S∪{v0}. The maximum of all these distances is 1. Then vI(S) = 1.
To calculate v∗I (S) we need to consider 4 subgraphs, i.e., the subgraphs induced by
the node sets S ∪ {v0}, S ∪ {v0, v4}, S ∪ {v0, v5}, and V . It is easy to check that the
diameter of all these 4 subgraphs is 2. For example, the diameter of the entire graph
is given by d(v4, v5) = 2. Therefore v
∗
I (S) = 2.
v0
v1
v2 v3 v4v5
1
1
0.5 0.5
1
1
0.5
0.5
Figure 1: The graph of Example 1.1
Finding a minimum diameter spanning Steiner subgraph of a given subset of
nodes seems to be an interesting combinatorial problem which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature. (Note that unlike the minimum
length spanning Steiner subgraph, the minimum diameter spanning subgraph is not
necessarily a subtree.) We elaborate on the complexity of this problem in Sections
3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Our goal is to investigate the existence of core elements for the two games. In
Section 2 we show that C(N, vI) is always nonempty. Moreover, there is an extreme
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point of C(N, vI), which has at most two nonnegative components (associated with a
diametrical pair). We also prove that testing whether a given vector x is in C(N, vI)
is NP-hard. In Section 3 we study the game (N, v∗I ). We show that its core C(N, v
∗
I )
may be empty when the set of players is a proper subset of V \ {v0}. On the other
hand, if the set of players is equal to V \ {v0}, then C(N, vI) ⊆ C(N, v
∗
I ). We also
show that the problem of computing v∗I (S) for a given subset of players is NP-hard to
approximate within a multiplicative factor strictly smaller than 4/3, and v∗I (S) can
be efficiently approximated within a factor 2. Finally, we prove that for any coalition
S, vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S) ≤ 2vI(S), which in turn implies that any vector in C(N, vI) is a
1/2-budget balanced allocation of the game C(N, v∗I ). In Section 4, some results on
the calculation of the nucleolus and the Shapley value are shown for the particular
case of tree networks. We also present a compact formulation of the core in this case.
The paper ends with some conclusions.
2. The Minimum Diameter Location Game, (N, vI)
This section is devoted to the MDLG. We first prove that C(N, vI) is nonempty.
Theorem 2.1 Given a graph G = (V,E), and a subset N ⊆ V \ {v0}, let (N, vI) be
the respective minimum diameter location game, defined over A(G). Then, there is
an extreme point of C(N, vI), which has at most two positive components.
Proof. Let vi, vj ∈ N ∪ {v0} such that vI(N) = d(vi, vj).
If vj = v0, define the allocation x
′ by setting x′i = vI(N) = d(vi, v0), and x
′
k = 0,
for any k 6= i. It is easy to see that x′ is in the core since for each coalition S such
that vi ∈ S, we have x
′(S) = x′i = d(vi, v0) ≤ vI(S).
Next suppose that vi 6= v0 and vj 6= v0. We present two extreme points of
C(N, vI). First, define the allocation x
′ by setting x′i = d(vi, v0), x
′
j = vI(N) −
d(vi, v0), and x
′
k = 0 for any k 6= i, j. Note that by the triangle inequality, x
′
j ≤
d(vj, v0) = vI({vj}).
Then, x′(S) = vI(N) = d(vi, vj) ≤ vI(S), for each coalition S, satisfying i, j ∈ S.
Also, x′(N) = vI(N). If vi ∈ S and vj /∈ S, then x
′(S) = x′i = d(vi, v0) ≤ vI(S).
Similarly, if j ∈ S and i /∈ S, then x′(S) = x′j ≤ d(vj, v0) ≤ vI(S).
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A second extreme point of C(N, vI), x
′′
, is similarly defined by setting, x
′′
j =
d(vj, v0), x
′′
i = vI(N) − d(vj, v0), and x
′′
k = 0 for any k 6= i, j. This concludes the
proof. 
In spite of the facts that C(N, vI) is nonempty and that vI(S) can efficiently be
computed for any coalition S, we next show that testing membership in the core for
a given vector x is NP-hard for general graphs. Note that the latter task amounts
to testing whether minS⊆N(vI(S)− x(S)) ≥ 0.
Formally, given an MDLG with an underlying graph G = (V,E) with positive
edge weights, and an allocation vector x, the core membership decision problem is to
determine whether x is not in the core C(N, vI).
Theorem 2.2 The core membership decision problem is NP-hard even when G =
(V,E) is a complete graph, N = V \ {v0}, the edge lengths satisfy the triangle in-
equality, and x distributes the total cost vI(N) equally.
Proof. We formulate the independent set problem (Garey and Johnson (1979))
as an instance of the core membership decision problem. An instance of the NP-
Complete independent set problem is an undirected graph G1 = (V1, E1) and an
integer k, and the decision problem is whether G1 has an independent set (i.e., a set
of nodes such that no pair of them are adjacent) of size greater than k. Without loss
of generality we may assume that |V1| is even and k = |V1|/2. (If k ≤ |V1|/2, add
|V1| − 2k isolated nodes to G1. If k > |V1|/2, add a clique with 2k − |V1| to G1.)
Let G1 = (V1, E1) be an undirected graph with V1 = {v1, . . . , vn}. Let G2 =
(V1, E2) be the complete graph with node set V1. Associate a positive length with
each edge of E2 as follows: If e ∈ E1 then set the length of e to be equal to n. If
e /∈ E1 then set the length of e to be equal to n/2. Let G3 = (V1 ∪ {v0}, E3) be the
graph obtained from G2 by adding the node v0 and the n edges connecting v0 to the
n nodes in V1. The length of each one of these n edges is set to be equal to n/2.
Note that G3 is a complete graph with n+1 nodes, and its edges satisfy the triangle
inequality.
Next, set N = V1 and consider the game (N, vI), defined on A(G3). In order to
prove our claim, we will show that x = (1, . . . , 1) is not in C(N, vI) if and only if
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the graph G1 has an independent set of cardinality greater than n/2. We assume
without loss of generality that E1 is nonempty, and therefore vI(N) = n.
First note that vI(S) ∈ {n, n/2} for any S ⊆ N . Also, vI(N) = n =
∑n
j=1 xj .
Suppose that G1 has an independent set S with |S| > n/2. Then, by definition
vI(S) = n/2 < |S| =
∑
vj∈S
xj = x(S), and therefore x /∈ C(N, vI).
Next suppose that there is a subset S ⊆ N such that vI(S) < x(S) =
∑
vj∈S
xj =
|S| ≤ n. Therefore, vI(S) = n/2, and |S| > n/2. In particular, the subgraph
induced by S has its diameter equal to n/2. By the definition of the edge lengths,
S is an independent set of G1 (otherwise there would exist a pair vi, vj ∈ S with
d(vi, vj) = n). Since |S| > n/2, the result is proven. 
In view of the above result it is unlikely that there is a formulation of C(N, vI)
involving only a polynomial number of linear constraints. In Section 4 we present an
efficient representation of C(N, vI) for tree graphs.
3. The Minimum Steiner Subgraph Diameter Location Game, (N, v∗
I
)
Unlike the game (N, vI), we will show that the core of the game (N, v
∗
I ) can be
empty when N is a proper subset of V \{v0}, and it is nonempty when N = V \{v0}.
In the latter case we call the game complete. Note that when the game is complete,
vI(N) = v
∗
I (N). This is summarized in the following result.
Proposition 3.1 Let N ⊆ V \{v0}. Then for any S ⊆ N , vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S). Moreover,
if N = V \ {v0}, then vI(N) = v
∗
I (N).
Theorem 3.1 Given a graph G = (V,E), suppose that N = V \ {v0}. Let (N, vI∗)
be the respective minimum Steiner subgraph diameter location game, defined over
A(G). Then, there is an extreme point of C(N, v∗I ), which has at most two positive
components.
Proof. The result follows from the above proposition and Theorem 2.1, since
C(N, vI) ⊆ C(N, v
∗
I ) in this case. 
The next result follows directly from Theorem 2.2 since the games (N, vI) and
(N, v∗I ) are identical when the underlying graph is complete and its edges satisfy the
triangle inequality.
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Theorem 3.2 Let G = (V,E) be a complete graph and let N = V \ {v0}. Suppose
that its edges satisfy the triangle inequality. Let x = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Then the problem
of determining whether x is not in C(N, v∗I ) is NP-hard.
The next example shows that the core of the game (N, v∗I ) might be empty.
Example 3.1 Consider the graph G = (V,E), where
V = {v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v
′
1, v
′
2, v
′
3, v
′
4}
and
E = {(v0, v
′
1), (v0, v
′
2), (v0, v
′
3), (v0, v
′
4), (v1, v
′
2), (v1, v
′
3), (v1, v
′
4), (v2, v
′
1),
(v2, v
′
3), (v2, v
′
4), (v3, v
′
1), (v3, v
′
2), (v3, v
′
4), (v4, v
′
1), (v4, v
′
2), (v4, v
′
3)}.
All edges are of unit length, see Figure 2.
v0
v1 v2 v3 v4
v′1 v
′
2 v
′
3 v
′
4
Figure 2: The graph of Example 3.1
Consider the case where the set of players is N = {v1, v2, v3, v4}. It is easy
to see that for each S with |S| = 3, v∗I (S) = 2, and v
∗
I (N) = 3. (The superset
yielding v∗I (N) must include some node v
′
i and the distance between vi and v
′
i on the
entire graph is 3.) If x was in the core it would have to satisfy, x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2,
x1+x3+x4 ≤ 2, x1+x2+x4 ≤ 2, and x2+x3+x4 ≤ 2. Summing these inequalities
yields 3(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4) ≤ 8, which is not possible when x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 3.
Also note that vI(N) = 2 < v
∗
I (N).
In the above example the set of players N is a proper subset of V \ {v0}, and
therefore it does not contradict Proposition 3.1 nor Theorem 3.1.
The results on the emptiness and nonemptiness of C(N, v∗I ) have also been ob-
served in some other combinatorial optimization games. For example, in the min-
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imum spanning tree game v(S) is the total length of a Steiner subtree spanning
S∪{v0}. The core of this game is nonempty if the set of players satisfies N = V \{v0},
Granot and Huberman (1981), although it can be empty if N is a proper subset of
V \ {v0}, Tamir (1991).
Remark 3.1 Theorem 3.1 implies that some variants of the complete version of
(N, v∗I ) also have nonempty cores when N = V \ {v0}. Consider for example the
game (N, v′I), defined by the characteristic function
v′I(S) = D
∗(Gv0(S)).
Unlike the games (N, vI) and (N, v
∗
I ), this game is not even monotone, and
therefore can have core allocations which are not nonnegative. Nevertheless, since
v∗I (S) ≤ v
′
I(S), for all coalitions S ⊆ N , and v
∗
I (N) = v
′
I(N), we conclude that
C(N, v∗I ) ⊆ C(N, v
′
I). In fact, it is easy to see that C(N, v
∗
I ) = C(N, v
′
I) ∩ R
N
+ .
3.1. Computing v∗I (S)
In this section we show several examples and observations on properties and
approximability of v∗I (S).
Remark 3.2 As noted in the introduction, for any S there is a minimum diameter
Steiner subgraph of S which contains Gv0(S). Clearly, the entire graph may not be
a minimum diameter of some S. (Consider, for example, a 2-star tree with V =
{v0, v1, v2} centered at v0, N = {v1, v2} and S = {v1}.)
Moreover, even if the diameter of Gv0(S) is unique and strictly greater than the
distance in G between the unique diametrical pair of Gv0(S), the minimum diameter
Steiner subgraph of S can still be Gv0(S). In other words, adding to Gv0(S) a shortest
path in G between the diametrical pair may increase the diameter, as shown in the
following example.
Example 3.2 Consider the following 12-node graph G with unit edge lengths. There
is a 10-node cycle where the nodes vi, i = 0, 1, . . . , 9, are cyclically ordered. In
addition there are the edges (v3, v10) and (v10, v11), see Figure 3.
Let S = {v1, . . . , v6, v10, v11}. The diameter of Gv0(S) is equal to 6, and it is
uniquely attained by the pair v0, v6. The shortest distance in G between v0 and v6 is
4. However, adding the shortest path in G between v0 and v6 to Gv0(S) yields the
graph G itself with D∗(G) = 7.
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v0 v1
v2
v3
v4
v5v6
v7
v8
v9
v10 v11
Figure 3: The graph of Example 3.2
The above example can be extended to show that adding to the graph a shortest
path between a diametrical pair of Gv0(S) can asymptotically increase the diameter
by a factor of 1/2.
Example 3.3 Consider the 5 node graph G = (V,E), where V = {v0, v1, . . . , v4}
and E = {(v0, v1), (v0, v2), (v0, v3), (v1, v4), (v2, v4)}, depicted in Figure 4 (thin line).
For a ∈ Z, the lengths of its edges are: a for edges (v0, v1) and (v0, v2), and a− 1 for
the other 3 edges, (v0, v3), (v1, v4) and (v2, v4).
Let S = {v1, v2, v3}. Then, Gv0(S) is the 3-star centered at node v0. Augmenting
the shortest path between the diametrical pair {v1, v2} will increase the diameter from
2a to 3a− 2.
v0
v1
v2
v4 v3
v5
v6
a
a
a− 1
1/2
1/2
2a− 2
a− 1
a− 1
Figure 4: Example 3.3 and 3.4 in thin and thick lines, respectively
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Remark 3.3 Note, however, that an increase by a factor of 1/2, observed in the
above example, is the worst case over all graphs.
Consider a general graph G = (V,E). Let S ⊆ N . Suppose without loss of
generality that v1, v2 is a diametrical pair in Gv0(S). Let P (v1, v2) be a shortest path
in A(G) between them. Let G′(S) denote the graph obtained from Gv0(S) by adding
P (v1, v2). Then, for each pair of nodes, vi ∈ Gv0(S) and vj ∈ P (v1, v2),
dG′(S)(vi, vj) ≤ min(dGv0 (S)(vi, v1) + d(v1, vj)
⇒ dGv0(S)(vi, v2) + d(v2, vj)) ≤ dGv0(S)(v1, v2) + min(d(v1, vj)
⇒ d(v2, vj)) ≤ dGv0 (S)(v1, v2) + (1/2)d(v1, v2) ≤ (3/2)dGv0(S)(v1, v2).
(For each subgraph G∗, and a pair of nodes vs, vt, we let dG∗(vs, vt) denote the distance
between vs and vt in A(G
∗).)
Also, note that even when the addition of a shortest path does not improve the
diameter, it is still possible to improve it by adding some other path, as shown in
the next example.
Example 3.4 Consider the graph in Example 3.3. Instead of adding the edges
(v1, v4), (v4, v2), add the edges (v1, v5), (v5, v6), (v6, v2) of lengths 1/2, 2a−2, and 1/2,
respectively, see Figure 4.
The length of the path that we have added is 2a − 1, which is larger than the
length of the path (v1, v4, v2). Nevertheless, its addition to the 3-star will decrease
the diameter from 2a to 2a− 1/2.
3.1.1. A 2-approximation for v∗I (S)
A modification of the above construction can be used to obtain a 2-approximation
for v∗I (S), and prove that v
∗
I (S) ≤ 2vI(S).
Consider the game (N, v∗I ), defined on a general undirected graph G. Let S ⊆ N .
To approximate v∗I (S) consider the subgraph Gv0(S). For each pair of nodes vi, vj
of Gv0(S) add to Gv0(S) a shortest path, say P (vi, vj), connecting the pair in A(G).
Let L∗ denote the maximum length of these paths. By definition L∗ = vI(S). Let
G′(S) denote the graph obtained after the addition. It is easy to see that for each
pair vt, vs in G
′(S), dG′(S)(vt, vs), the distance between them in A(G
′(S)), satisfies
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dG′(S)(vt, vs) ≤ 2L
∗ = 2vI(S). Thus,
vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S) ≤ D
∗(G′(S)) ≤ 2vI(S).
We conclude that D∗(G′(S)) is a 2-approximation of v∗I (S), and
Theorem 3.3 Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), suppose that N ⊆ V \ {v0}.
Then for any S ⊆ N , vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S) ≤ 2vI(S).
The following example shows that the factor 2 is asymptotically best possible for
the approximation D∗(G′(S)).
Example 3.5 Consider a 4-star centered at v0. The nodes v1, v2 are connected to v0
with edges of length a, and the nodes v3, v4 are connected to v0 with edges of length
a − δ. Define S = {v1, v2, v3, v4}. Next, add node v5 to the star and connect it to
nodes v1 and v2 with edges of length a−δ. Also, add node v6 to the star and connect it
to nodes v3 and v4 with edges of length a−2δ, see Figure 5. We then have v
∗
I (S) = 2a
and D∗(G′(S)) = d(v5, v6) = 4a− 4δ. Hence, D
∗(G′(S)) = 2v∗I (S)− 4δ.
v0
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5v6
a
a
a − δ
a − δ
a − δ
a − δ
a − 2δ
a − 2δ
Figure 5: The graph of Example 3.5
Example 1.1 shows that 2vI(S) is a tight upper bound on v
∗
I (S).
Using game theory terminology, Caprara and Letchford (2010), the last theorem
implies that every vector x ∈ C(N, vI), is a 1/2-budget balanced vector of the game
C(N, v∗I ), i.e., for any S ⊆ N , x(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S), and (1/2)v
∗
I (N) ≤ x(N) ≤ v
∗
I (N).
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3.1.2. Inapproximability of v∗I (S)
Generally, the problem of computing v∗I (S) for a given coalition is NP-hard, (Levin
(2008)). It is not known whether the approximation factor 2 is best possible, although
to get a better approximation a different solution approach would be required. How-
ever, we have slightly modified the NP-hardness proof of Levin (Levin (2008)) to
show that even approximating within a constant factor α, α < 4/3, is already NP-
hard. Since Levin’s proof is unpublished, for the sake of completeness, we
include a proof of our modified inapproximability result.
Lemma 3.1 For any α < 4/3, approximating v∗I (S) within a constant factor α, is
NP-hard.
Proof. The reduction is from SAT.
Consider a SAT instance whose literals arew1, . . . , wn, and its clauses are C1, . . . , Cm.
Let us denote the negation of wi by ui. Construct a graph whose node set is w1, ..., wn,
u1, ..., un, C1, ..., Cm, t (i.e., one node for each literal or its negation, one node for
each clause and one additional node for the true assignment). The set S is defined
by S = {C1, ..., Cm} and v0 = t. It remains to define the edge lengths.
Let 0 < ε ≤ 1/3. Each clause is connected to its literals via edges of length
1− ε. The length of each edge connecting two literals is 1 + ε, if they correspond to
different variables, and for every i = 1, . . . , n, the length of the edge(wi, ui) is 2+ 2ε.
The length of an edge between any two clauses is 2. The length of an edge between
t and a clause node is 3. Finally, the length of an edge between t and wi or ui (for
every i = 1, . . . , n) is 1 + ε.
In this graph there is a superset S ′, S ⊆ S ′, such that the subgraph induced by
S ′ ∪ {v0} has diameter at most 2 if and only if the SAT formula can be satisfied.
First note that if there is a satisfying assignment then picking the true literals
with S gives the correct S ′ with diameter at most 2.
It remains to consider the other direction. Assume that there is a superset S ′ such
that the induced diameter is at most 2. Note that by the constraint 0 < ε ≤ 1/3, for
every i = 1, . . . , n, S ′ may contain either wi or ui but not both, because the distance
between these two nodes is greater than 2. (By the choice of ε this distance is
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equal to 2 + 2ε.) Assign a true value to the node that belongs to S ′ among the two
nodes.
Then, note that for every Cj there is a literal whose node is in S
′ and therefore
every clause has a true literal, so this assignment satisfies the SAT formula.
To observe that approximating within a constant factor α < 4/3 is NP-hard we
note that in the above construction, if v∗I (S) > 2 then v
∗
I (S) = 2+2ε. Thus, choosing
ε = 1/3 yields the result. 
4. Tree networks
In this section we focus on the interesting case of tree graphs. Let T = (V,E)
be a tree graph with V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , en}. Let N ⊆ V \ {v0}
be the set of players. It is easy to see that in this case the two games, (N, vI) and
(N, v∗I ), coincide, i.e., vI(S) = v
∗
I (S), for any S ⊆ N . We present an O(n
3) algorithm
for calculating the Shapley value. In addition, we provide a compact representation
of the core of the game, which has O(n2) linear constraints.
First, it is shown in Tamir (1993) that the diameter function is submodular, i.e.,
for each pair of subsets S1 ⊆ N , S2 ⊆ N ,
vI(S1 ∪ S2) + vI(S1 ∩ S2) ≤ vI(S1) + vI(S2).
As a result we conclude that the minimum diameter game on a tree network is
concave. (See Shapley (1971) for a characterization of the core of concave games.)
Also, since the game is concave, its nucleolus (Kohlberg (1972)) can be computed
in polynomial time, (see Kuipers (1996), and Faigle et al. (2001)), and membership
in the core can be verified in polynomial time.
Moreover, since the diameter game (N, vI) is concave, it follows that its Shapley
value is always an allocation in the core of the game. Recall that the Shapley value
is the allocation φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) given by
φk =
∑
S⊂N\{vk}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(vI(S ∪ {vk})− vI(S)) ∀ vk ∈ N, (1)
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where s = |S|.
Generally, assuming that the characteristic function is already known, it might
take an exponential number of basic operations with respect to the number of players,
to explicitly calculate φ by the above expression. In the rest of the section we show
that, for diameter games defined on tree graphs, φ can be calculated in polynomial
time.
First note that for each possible value of vI(S∪{vk})−vI(S) there can be several
combinations of coalitions S and players vk giving this value.
Consider some vk ∈ N , and a coalition S ⊆ N \ {vk}. In order to analyze the
values that vI(S ∪ {vk})− vI(S) can take on, we use the classical result of Handler
(1973). Given a subtree T ′, to find a diametrical pair of nodes of T ′ = (V ′, E ′),
arbitrarily choose some node of T ′, say vp. Let vq satisfy d(vq, vp) = maxvi∈V ′ d(vi, vp),
and let vr satisfy d(vr, vq) = maxvi∈V ′ d(vi, vq). The pair {vq, vr} is a diametrical pair
of T ′. This pair can therefore be found in O(|V ′|) time. This result implies the
following property.
Lemma 4.1 Let {vq, vr} be a diametrical pair of T
′ = (V ′, E ′), and let T” =
(V ”, E”) be a subtree of T ′ such that vq ∈ V ”. Then, there is a node vs ∈ V ”,
such that {vq, vs} is a diametrical pair of T
′′.
We now apply the lemma to the case where T ′ is the minimal subtree spanning
S ∪ {v0, vk} and T” is the minimal subtree spanning S ∪ {v0}.
The following cases may arise:
• S = ∅. Then, vI(S ∪ {vk}) = d(vk, v0), vI(S) = 0.
• vI(S ∪ {vk}) = d(v0, vk). Then, there exists vj ∈ S such that vI(S) = d(vj , v0).
• vI(S∪{vk}) = d(vk, vj), for some vj ∈ S. In this case two subcases are possible:
1. vI(S) = d(vj , v0),
2. vI(S) = d(vj , vt), for some vt ∈ S.
• vI(S ∪{vk}) = d(vj, vi), for some pair vj , vi ∈ S ∪{v0}. Then, vI(S) = d(vj, vi)
and therefore vI(S ∪ {vk})− vI(S) = 0. (We do not have to take this case into
consideration in order to calculate the Shapley value.)
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Note that the implications stated with respect to the above cases follow
from Lemma 4.1, since if vI(S ∪ {vk}) = d(vk, vj), vj ∈ S ∪ {v0} then vI(S) is
given by the distance from vj to another point of S ∪ {v0}.
Using the above properties, the following algorithm to calculate the Shapley value
is proposed.
4.1. Algorithm: Computing the Shapley value
For each coalition S, the value vI(S) is a continuous function of the edge lengths
of the tree. Therefore, the Shapley value is continuous in the edge lengths. Hence, by
perturbing the edge lengths, if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality
that the distances between the nodes of the tree are distinct. (Specifically, if the
edge set of the tree T is given by E = {e1, ..., en}, then for each edge ej , we add the
term εj to its length l(ej).)
The algorithm we propose calculates the possible marginal values (vI(S∪{vk})−
vI(S)) by finding the values of the diameters of subsets of nodes. These diameters
are determined by all possible pairs of nodes in V .
In the first phase of the algorithm vI({vi, vj}) is calculated for each pair of nodes
vi, vj ∈ N , (vi and vj are not necessarily distinct.) The effort of this step is O(n
2).
In the second phase we consider all pairs of nodes in N .
• Consider first a pair of distinct nodes vi, vj ∈ N , such that vI({vi, vj}) =
d(vi, vj). By the above nondegeneracy assumption we have d(vi, vj) > d(vi, v0)
and d(vi, vj) > d(vj, v0).
Let T (i, j) be the maximal subtree with the diameter value equal to d(vi, vj).
It clearly takes O(n) time to calculate T (i, j). (Note that if x is the midpoint
of the unique path connecting vi with vj , then the node set of T (i, j) is given
by {vt : d(vt, x) ≤ d(vi, vj)/2}.)
Let N(i, j) be the number of nodes in T (i, j) \ {vi, vj}.
If vk is a node in T (i, j), then for each coalition S ⊆ T (i, j), containing both vi
and vj, we have vI(S∪{vk})−vI(S) = d(vi, vj)−d(vi, vj) = 0. Thus, it is suffi-
18
cient to consider only the case where vk /∈ T (i, j). Note that in this case, by the
maximality property of T (i, j), we have vI(S∪{vk}) = max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, vj)).
Hence, in this case for each coalition S ⊂ T (i, j), vk 6∈ S, containing both vi
and vj, we have vI(S ∪ {vk})− vI(S) = max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, vj))− d(vi, vj).
For each vk ∈ N , define
Ak = {{vi, vj} : vI({vi, vj}) = d(vi, vj),max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, vj)) > d(vi, vj)}.
• Next we consider the case where vI({vi, vj}) > d(vi, vj). Assume without loss
of generality that vI({vi, vj}) = d(vi, v0). Let T (i, 0) be the maximal subtree
with the diameter value equal to d(vi, v0). Let N(i, 0) be the number of nodes
in T (i, 0) \ {vi}. As above, it is sufficient to consider only the case where vk /∈
T (i, 0). Note that in this case we have vI(S ∪ {vk}) = max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, v0)).
Thus, in this case for each coalition S ⊂ T (i, 0), containing vi, we have vI(S ∪
{vk})− vI(S) = max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, v0))− d(vi, v0).
For each vk ∈ N , define
Bk = {vi : max(d(vk, v0), d(vk, vi)) > d(vi, v0)}.
Consider now a subtree T (i, j), with i, j > 0. Then in this case, the number of
times that the triplet {vi, vk, vj} and the pair {vi, vj} assume the marginal value
max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, vj)) − d(vi, vj), for coalitions of size r + 2, r = 0, . . . , N(i, j) (r
different nodes plus the two nodes vi, vj) is
(
N(i,j)
r
)
. Similarly, for a subtree T (i, 0) the
number of times that the pair {vi, vk} and the singleton {vi} assume the marginal
value max(d(vk, v0), d(vk, vi))−d(vi, v0), for coalitions of size r+1, r = 0, . . . , N(i, 0)
(r different nodes plus vi) is
(
N(i,0)
r
)
.
Therefore, for each pair vi ∈ N and vj ∈ N ∪ {v0}, the coefficients that weight
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each marginal value in our approach are given by the formula:
C(i, j) =


N(i,j)∑
r=0
(
N(i, j)
r
)
(r + 2)!(n− (r + 2)− 1)!
n!
j 6= 0
N(i,0)∑
r=0
(
N(i, 0)
r
)
(r + 1)!(n− (r + 1)− 1)!
n!
j = 0
(2)
Summarizing, the Shapley value of a given player vk ∈ N is:
φk =
∑
{vi,vj}∈Ak
C(i, j)(max(d(vk, vi), d(vk, vj))− d(vi, vj))
+
∑
vi∈Bk
C(i, 0)(max(d(vk, v0), d(vk, vi))− d(vi, v0)).
For each pair {vi, vj}, C(i, j) can be calculated in O(n) time. Hence, for each
k = 1, ..., n, φk can be computed in O(n
2) time. Therefore, the complexity of the
algorithm to compute the Shapley value is O(n3).
4.2. Core representation
We have proved above that testing membership in the cores C(N, vI) and C(N, v
∗
I )
is NP-hard. Hence, it is very unlikely that these cores have compact representations
for general graphs. We will next give a compact representation of the core of these
games involving O(n2) constraints, for tree graphs.
First we note that in this case, if N = {v1, ..., vn}, vI(N) is equal to the diameter
of the tree T , (Handler (1973); Hassin and Tamir (1995)) and can be found by solving
the continuous (or absolute) 1-center problem on T , in O(n) time.
More generally, when N ⊆ V \ {v0}, then for each coalition S ⊆ N , vI(S) is
defined as the diameter length of a minimal spanning tree of S ∪ {v0}. Such a tree,
say T ∗(S), solves the continuous 1-center problem for the subset of nodes S ∪ {v0}.
Recall that the continuous 1-center problem for some subset V ′ ⊆ V , defines the
smallest radius neighborhood in the metric space A(T ), which covers V ′.
Moreover, T ∗(S) has the following property. There is an edge of T , say (vi, vj),
such that the 1-center of T ∗(S) is on this edge, and
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vI(S) = d(vp, vi) + l(vi, vj) + d(vj, vq),
for some nodes vp, vq ∈ S ∪ {v0}.
Clearly, the total number of centers of relevant minimum diameter spanning sub-
trees is O(n2). In this case each pair of nodes, vp, vq ∈ N ∪ {v0} contributes one
candidate, denoted by cp,q, the midpoint of the unique simple path connecting vp
with vq. If d(v0, cp,q) ≤ d(vp, vq)/2, the respective maximal coalition is then defined
by
Sp,q = {u ∈ N : d(u, cp,q) ≤ d(vp, vq)/2}.
If d(v0, cp,q) > d(vp, vq)/2, set Sp,q = ∅.
It is then clear that the core of this game is defined by the O(|N |2) constraints
given in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.2 For a tree graph T = (V,E),
C(N, vI) = {x ∈ R
N
+ : x(N) = vI(N), x(Sp,q) ≤ vI(Sp,q), ∀ p, q ∈ N ∪ {v0}}.
The above polynomial representation of the core implies that membership in the
core, can be tested in strongly polynomial time by the algorithm in Tardos (1986).
Remark 4.1 When the tree network is a path, the minimum diameter game coin-
cides with the minimum spanning tree game discussed in Megiddo (1978). Hence,
the efficient algorithms in Megiddo (1978) can be used to efficiently compute, both
the nucleolus and the Shapley value.
Conclusions
To summarize, we have shown that C(N, vI) is always nonempty. Also, C(N, vI) ⊆
C(N, v∗I ) when V = N ∪ {v0}. On the other hand, C(N, v
∗
I ) can be empty if N is
a proper subset of V \ {v0}. Generally, we have proved that for any coalition S,
vI(S) ≤ v
∗
I (S) ≤ 2vI(S), which in turn implies that any core allocation of C(N, vI)
is also a (1/2)-budget balanced allocation of the game (N, v∗I ).
We have also proved that recognizing whether a given vector x is in the core of
the games (N, vI) and (N, v
∗
I ) is NP-hard. For tree graphs the games (N, vI) and
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(N, v∗I ) coincide and they are submodular. Also for the tree graph case, we have
presented a compact formulation of the core, and given a polynomial algorithm to
compute the Shapley value.
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